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WORLD-POLITICS.

LONDON: ROME: WASHINGTON.

LONDON, *December, 1908.*

“THE TIMES” in no way exaggerated when it said that the Agreement between the United States and Japan was hailed “with the deepest gratification” by the British people. No international development in the Far East could have been more absolutely in line with British wishes and policy, and the welcome given to it was immediate, hearty and spontaneous. It is precisely what British diplomacy has hoped and worked for. Directly the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in its extended and more effective form was concluded in 1905, it was prophesied in this REVIEW that it would become the nucleus of a Far Eastern league of peace. The prophecy has been fulfilled. Russia, France and now the United States have each in turn subscribed to its central purposes; and so far as diplomatic conventions can insure it, the peace of the Far East, the integrity of China and the principle of the open door are now firmly buttressed. But it is not on that account alone that Great Britain has so warmly welcomed the new Agreement. She welcomes it also because it brings together one Power for whom she has nothing but the friendliest sentiments and another Power with whom she is linked in the closest possible bonds of political co-operation. It is no secret that the friction between the United States and Japan over the immigration question and over the treatment of American trade in Manchuria has been watched by Great Britain with extreme regret and not a little anxiety. Her relief is, therefore, all the greater that the two Governments should at last have realized how small and unimportant are their points of difference compared with their points of agreement, how little either has to gain by ill-will

and how greatly a frank political understanding must conduce to the advantage of both. But besides this the Agreement is peculiarly acceptable to British opinion because it emphasizes anew America's interest in the politics of the Far East—an interest that ten years ago was virtually non-existent—and registers her determination to assume the active and commanding rôle imposed upon her by her commercial and political stake in the future of the Pacific. The greater that interest and the more active that rôle, the more confident is Great Britain that the identity of Anglo-American aims will be fully established and that Anglo-American co-operation will become a fixed point in Far Eastern politics. Moreover, the mere fact of the Agreement is regarded over here as marking a momentous, almost indeed a revolutionary, departure from American traditions. It is the first formal acknowledgment in our time that for the United States the days of "isolation" and "independent action" are over and that working compacts for specified ends with other Powers are to be included henceforward among the resources of American diplomacy. This is a development with which British opinion is altogether in sympathy. It makes American participation in *Weltpolitik* far more effective than it was or could have been when the State Department at Washington and American popular prejudice unreflectingly and automatically ruled out the possibility of such arrangements; and it brings an Anglo-American alliance so much the nearer.

Great Britain, however, has noted with some astonishment that while the Agreement appears to have been overwhelmingly approved by the American press and American opinion generally, Mr. Root has not dared to cast it in the form of a Treaty for submission to and ratification by the Senate. The reasons why he has refrained from this step are well understood over here and are taken as indicating a somewhat serious defect in America's equipment for international politics.

The British press and the British Parliament, but not, I fear, the British people, have been a good deal occupied during the past few weeks with the problems of national defence. The discussion in the main has centred on two questions, (1) Can England be invaded? and (2) Does the two-Power standard of British naval strength include or exclude the United States? On the first question, that of the possibility of an invasion, it may be re-

membered that Mr. Balfour three and a half years ago, when he was still Premier, delivered a very remarkable speech. He laid it down as an axiom of home defence that the landing of 70,000 hostile troops in Great Britain was "impossible" and that "serious invasion of these islands is not an eventuality which we need seriously consider." Taking France as the hypothetical enemy, Mr. Balfour established the impossibility of invading England on the grounds that the transport of 70,000 men would require 210,000 tons of shipping, whereas it had been ascertained that there were as a rule only 100,000 tons in the French Channel and Atlantic ports; that even if the transport were available it would be a difficult matter to concentrate it all at one port; that the landing of the force would take forty-eight hours; and that the battleships, cruisers, torpedo craft and submarines attached to the British reserve would be amply sufficient, even in the absence of the sea-going fleets, to repel the attack. But Mr. Balfour's contentions even in 1905 were hotly assailed not only by experts in strategy, but by all who realized the danger of allowing a rich, mercantile and unarmed nation to cherish the illusion that its security was unassailable. Since 1905, moreover, the conditions of warfare have considerably changed and the potential power of an attacking force has been largely increased. No one in Great Britain has insisted on the reality of these changes more powerfully than Lord Roberts, who for the past two or three years has been conducting a laborious campaign of popular education in an effort to arouse his countrymen to the reality of the menace that confronts them. In the last week of November he returned to the subject with one of the most startling and impressive speeches to which the House of Lords has ever listened. Instead of imagining an invasion from France he imagined one from Germany. He showed that vessels suitable for the transport of 200,000 men are at all times available in the northern ports of Germany; that the men could be collected without any fuss or publicity or mobilization arrangements; that they could be embarked in a much shorter time than Mr. Balfour had calculated; that instead of three tons of shipping per man being required, one and a half tons would be sufficient for all purposes; and that with the enormous boat accommodation of the big modern liners, with the frequent practice of the troops in embarking and disembarking, with the education given to the officers of the merchant

marine serving in the reserve, and with the various mechanical appliances which now exist, "the disembarkation of German troops could be carried out far more expeditiously than had been thought possible in the case of French troops." Remembering that the German Government owned the railways and could operate with a secrecy and despatch unattainable in England, that the North Sea offered chances of escaping detection that were absent in the case of the English Channel, and that there were some 80,000 Germans, almost all of them trained soldiers, already resident in the United Kingdom, Lord Roberts expressed his deliberate conviction that 150,000 German troops could be landed in Great Britain, that in the absence of the regular army there was no force adequate to the task of repelling them, and that it was the bounden duty of the country to set about organizing a national citizen army of at least a million men.

I think there is no question that the movement in favor of national service on the Swiss model is growing in this country. It is growing, but it will be a long while before it is taken under the wing of either of the great parties. The general instinct of the country—and I am not at all sure that it is not a sound instinct—is that for purposes of defence the supreme reliance must be placed on the Navy. Nobody has ever denied that a small force might conceivably slip through the lines of naval defence and make a raid on British soil. The question is as to the figure at which this force should reasonably be put. For the past few years it has been more or less common ground that British preparations for home defence should be on such a scale as to make it necessary for an invader who had any hope of success to come with a larger force than 70,000 men. But if an invasion of this magnitude were to be attempted, then the Navy is confident it could not reach British shores undetected and that, once perceived, it could be satisfactorily dealt with. The country therefore believes, though with diminishing confidence, that a formidable invasion would be repulsed by the Navy and that a small raiding force would more than find its match in the territorial force now being organized by Mr. Haldane. If it could be shown that Lord Roberts's fears were justified, the nation would not shrink from the necessary sacrifices. But at present it is not prepared to maintain, first, the all-powerful navy necessitated by its insular position; secondly, the regular army called for by

the requirements of the Empire; and thirdly, a citizen army of a million men for repelling invasion.

The other problem of national defence which has also been discussed was started by Mr. Asquith's announcement that he accepted on behalf of the Government the formula of naval strength to which previous Governments had subscribed—namely, that the British Navy in capital ships should equal the next two strongest navies *plus* ten per cent. The "Westminster Gazette," which stands, as it deserves to do, nearer to the Government than any other journal, sought to limit the effect of this pledge by arguing that when Mr. Asquith spoke of the next two strongest navies he meant the next two strongest navies in Europe. The "Westminster Gazette" argued further that the wealth, the vast resources and the friendship of America made it both foolish and unnecessary to reckon her among Great Britain's naval competitors. In view of the uncertainty thus inspired Mr. Asquith was invited to be more precise. He therefore declared that by the next two strongest Powers he meant the two Powers that happened to be strongest, "whichever they may be and wherever situated," adding that he saw nothing in that statement at all at variance with an earlier declaration of his, that Great Britain must be prepared to hold the sea against any "reasonably possible combination." But, as "The Nation," a Radical organ of great ability and influence, at once pointed out, the two formulas are in reality very different. The United States and Germany are the next two strongest Powers, but it is obvious that they are not a "reasonably possible combination." Is Great Britain to build against the united strength of both of them? "On that proposition," says "The Nation," "we have two remarks to make. The first is that the people of Great Britain cannot do it. The second is that the Liberal party will not try to do it. They will never consent to build against America." The "Spectator," on the other hand, a journal notoriously friendly to America, sweeps away all such qualifications, declares the friendship test to be wholly precarious and misleading, and insists that "the only safe plan is not to make any invidious distinction between friends and enemies, but to maintain the principle that, in order to secure our national safety, nay, our national existence, we must have a fleet which will be stronger by a substantial margin than any two navies that can possibly be brought against us." I will only

add to all this two statements of fact. The first is that the British Navy is at this moment nearer a three-Power than a two-Power standard. The second is that the British naval authorities, as they have shown by the withdrawal or reduction of their North Atlantic and West Indian squadrons, have practically wiped from their calculations the possibility of a war between Great Britain and the United States.

Many hopes and the best part of a year's Parliamentary work were ruined when the House of Lords contemptuously rejected the Government's Licensing Bill. The Bill was unquestionably overloaded, but it represented the most earnest effort that this generation has seen to grapple with the liquor trade and assert the supremacy of the state over a highly organized, wealthy and disreputable interest; and the action of the Lords in throwing it out, if it has not aroused much visible indignation, has, I believe, deeply shocked the moral sense of thousands of moderate men of all parties.

In one way, it is true, the Government may not be altogether displeased by the failure of their Bill. They are now left free to tax licenses as they are taxed in the United States, and as the current financial year is certain to end in a large deficit and as the entire expenditure for old-age pensions, education, the unemployed and the Navy mean a heavy budget for 1909-10, it is some consolation to them to feel that the rejection of the Bill enables them to tap this fruitful source of revenue. But that, after all, is a poor consolation. The fact remains that a measure of social reform, for which the Government received at the last election a direct mandate from the people, on which they have spent months of the most anxious and unrelenting labor, and around which the best opinion of the country had unmistakably gathered, has been killed by the Lords. What action the Government will take we do not know, though we do know they will not dissolve. They have to finance the old-age pension scheme, to amend the poor-law system and to bring in a measure of electoral reform before they can think of appealing to the country. When they do appeal it will be primarily on the issue of Free Trade, but, secondly, on the issue of the House of Lords.

The issue of the House of Lords is by far the most serious constitutional question, it is indeed the only one, that palpably awaits settlement.

ROME, December, 1908.

ACCORDING to the Italian Constitution five years is the extreme limit of a "Legislature," that is, the period of life of the Chamber of Deputies from one general election to another, or to its dissolution. However, it is an unwritten and accepted rule that no Legislature shall live out its life, so that from May 8th, 1848, when the first Legislature was inaugurated in Turin, none of the twenty-two which followed completed the five years, but had an average life of three years. This is done in order to spare the Government and the country the struggles and agitations connected with general elections when, either on account of internal troubles or because of international complications, they would be inopportune and dangerous, as the Constitution also establishes that, once the Chamber is dissolved or the Legislature has come to an end, a new Chamber must be convoked within four months, thus rendering the elections inevitable within that period.

For these reasons Signor Giolitti has practically decided that the next general elections shall take place during the spring, in April or May, as the present Legislature expires in the autumn of 1909, when, as we have seen, they would be inevitable no matter what was then happening in Italy or abroad, while it is another unwritten rule that they never take place in summer when the agriculturists of the peninsula, representing over two-thirds of the whole population, are engaged in the severest period of their labor. With regard to this it must be recalled that one of the problems in Italy is to obtain a large participation of the citizens in political life, so that while there is practically universal suffrage—as every man who is of age and knows how to read and write can vote—in reality the electors, according to the statistics of the last general elections, are only 2,541,327, that is to say, one-thirteenth of the whole population. In France, on the other hand, the electors are one-fourth, in Belgium and Germany one-fifth, and in Great Britain a little less than one-seventh.

All the same, Signor Giolitti may find himself confronted with serious obstacles even holding the coming general elections next spring, on account of the international situation which arose from the Balkan imbroglio, and which produced a counteraction in the internal politics of the peninsula. The unnecessarily high-handed proceedings followed by Austria in the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has rendered immensely more difficult the

already difficult situation of the young kingdom in its relations on one side with the Triple Alliance, and on the other with England and France, as, all secondary questions being discarded, what is really at the bottom of the European complications is the Anglo-German antagonism. The more this is accentuated, the more Italy is embarrassed, she being put to the alternative of choosing between her allies and her friends, which is extremely serious, and may have consequences of such a vital character as almost no other country in Europe has to fear at the present moment. Considering the reawakening of "Irredentism" throughout Italy, caused by the brawls between the German-Austrian and Italian students at the University of Vienna, last November, the superficial observer might come to the conclusion that her best policy would be to abandon the Triple Alliance, without even waiting for its expiration in 1912, which, it is remarked, could scarcely be objected to by Vienna after the late demonstration from there of the way in which they understand the respect due to international treaties. This, however, no matter how great may be the desire to join France and England, is practically impossible, it being now no more a mystery that the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple Alliance would be considered by Austria as a *casus belli*, and would be answered by the invasion of Lombardy and Venetia, for which the army of the Hapsburg Monarchy is already thoroughly prepared, having also on their side all the advantages of a geographically favorable position which places them at one day's march from Milan. A moderating action on the part of Germany to restrain Austria cannot be hoped for—as a very high personage explained to me very recently—all complications in the international affairs of Europe arise from a strange situation of what may be called a reciprocal friendly blackmailing between Vienna and Berlin. The Kaiser and his advisers are now convinced that the only friend on whom they can depend is their ancient enemy of Sadowa, and they have agreed, especially after the German failure at Algeiras, to back Austria unconditionally, diplomatically and militarily, in every conflict regarding her Southwestern frontiers, thus including the Balkans and Italy.

The "unconditionally" must not, of course, be understood in the sense that Germany does not get her return, which consists in Austria having agreed to put at her disposal her diplomacy and her army and navy against whomsoever she should fight in

Europe, without discussing the merits of the conflict. Italy in the Triplice is a mere addition, having the object of contributing to form one of the strongest compacts which have ever existed in Europe, and serving at the same time as an infallible index of what is to be expected, both Berlin and Vienna knowing that Rome will never leave them until she is sure that forces considered stronger than those of the Central Empires are ready to back her up. That is why at the first serious move of Italy to emancipate herself from the Triple Alliance, Austria would strike her blow, as Vienna and Berlin would then be convinced that their enemies had formed such a combination as to consider it superior to the Austro-German forces. What I have said is sufficient to make clear the impossibility for Italy, if she stands alone, to comply with the long-expressed desire of France, and that, relatively recent, of England, that she should leave the Triple Alliance.

An interesting feature of the approaching political struggle will be the attitude of the Vatican and the Catholic electors. As was the case with Leo XIII, Pius X also started his Pontificate by appearing animated with an intention of smoothing down the bitterness in the relations between Church and State. A *modus vivendi* between the two powers was even spoken of, and there is no doubt that the *non expedit*, viz., the prohibition to Catholics to participate in the political arena, was practically removed, so that several members of pure Catholic principles were returned in the general election of 1904, forming a nucleus of what might have later become a Papal party in the Italian Chamber. The new Pontiff, however, and his *entourage* soon saw the disadvantages of such a policy, which would have engaged the Church in the daily internal politics of the peninsula, to the detriment of her prestige, while the losses abroad would have been incalculable, financially and morally, as the Pope would have lost the independence of which his antagonism to Italy is the best guarantee, merely to appear as an Italian Bishop submitted to the powers ruling in Rome.

The Holy See, therefore, has lost no opportunity lately of reaffirming its traditional position of irreconcilability with the events which followed the fall of the Temporal Power. One of the best opportunities offered was the report spread by Court circles at Vienna to test the ground at the Vatican, that Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the throne, was to visit King Victor

at the Quirinal with the consent of the Pope. To well understand this it must be remembered that the late King Humbert and Queen Margherita, in October, 1881, went to Vienna, and that the Emperor Francis Joseph never returned this visit, because Leo XIII declared that any Catholic ruler who dared to be the guest of the King of Italy in the "Apostolic Palace of the Quirinal" would be excommunicated, while the King of Italy, in his turn, refuses to receive any Catholic ruler anywhere but in the capital of his kingdom. So far only King Ferdinand of Bulgaria and President Loubet have dared to challenge the thunders of the Head of the Church. Considering that the new Pope, elected through the veto which Austria put on the nomination of Cardinal Rampolla in the last Conclave, seemed to have brought about a considerable change, and considering the permanent reason for resentment which the unreturned visit of King Humbert to Vienna causes in the already difficult relations between Austria and Italy, the half-measure of sending the Crown Prince, who is not yet a ruler, to Rome was suggested to see whether it would be acceptable. This time the Vatican hurried to dissipate any uncertainty on the subject by having the "*Correspondenza Romana*," which is officially inspired by the Papal Secretaryship of State, publish a statement, which could not be clearer, and which is a most interesting document in the now historic struggle between the spiritual and civil powers in Rome. It runs as follows:

"The Roman question is not closed, although its closure has been announced by the side, but only by the side, which has an interest in so doing. The other side has always protested against the accomplished fact, and against force in the name of right.

"It is a solemn and well-known fact that the Holy See maintains its reserves, its protests and its rights. This may please or displease, but it would be puerile to dissimulate it or profess astonishment. Not less familiar is the double form principally adopted by the Holy See to render her attitude solemn and clear to the world. The Pope will not leave the Vatican: the Pope declares that he considers the visit of the Head of a Catholic State, or of his representative, to the third Rome, as an offence to him personally and to the Church.

"If the consequent omission of certain visits displeases certain persons they must blame themselves, or others, but never the Pope, who is by them constrained to assume an attitude which for him is a duty imposed by his conscience. Also the statement that the unpaid visits are gravely damaging to the interests of Italy is as misleading as it is

false, shown by the fact that they have not in the least interfered with alliances and closer relations between Italy and the countries whose rulers cannot visit Rome. These two points of the perennial pontifical protest show that it would be futile to fabricate subterfuges to take its significance of an offence to the Roman Pontiff and to the Catholic Church from the suggested visit of the Archduke. For this reason Pius X cannot but continue in the attitude and declarations of his predecessor regarding this question, and for this reason the attempt to make it appear that the visit of the Archduke to the third Rome would be considered by the Holy Father as acceptable and tolerable must be regarded as a vulgar deception."

WASHINGTON, December, 1908.

AN analysis of the revised results of the last Presidential election brings out some interesting facts which at first were overlooked. For instance, it appears that in four States only, to wit, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan and Wisconsin, did the Taft vote fall below that given to Roosevelt in 1904. On the other hand, it exceeded Roosevelt's in New York, Connecticut and New Jersey, as well as in California, Maine, Rhode Island, Nevada, North Dakota, Wyoming, Oregon and Washington. In Missouri Taft got more votes than did Roosevelt four years ago by nearly 26,000, and he outran Roosevelt in the industrial Southern States. Mr. Bryan ran behind his record in 1900 in twenty-one States, and in twenty-five States where Governors were elected the Democratic votes for Governor outnumbered those for President. Two deductions seem to follow: first, that the nomination of Bryan this year was a gross error, and, secondly, that Taft has at least a better chance of rupturing the Solid South than has been possessed by any previous Republican President.

It is hard to see what practical purpose President Roosevelt had in view when he spun out his last Message to such an inordinate length—it comprises some 21,000 words—in view of the fact, well known to him, that the present Congress has but a few working days before its tenure of life expires. Perhaps he had an idea of composing a Farewell Address, in which a summary of his characteristic notions might be handed down as a legacy to his countrymen. If that thought was in his mind, it is to be hoped that the Message will find more readers outside of Congress than it did within that body. Seldom, if ever, has an official communication from the Executive to the legislative branch of

our Federal Government been treated with less respect. That any of his injunctions will be heeded, or that any of the laws advocated by him will be placed upon the statute-book between now and the 4th of March, 1909, nobody believes. Of course, we would not go so far as to say that all of his recommendations deserve to be disregarded. For instance, Mr. Roosevelt is justified in averring that, as regards the liability of employers for injury caused by accidents in interstate transportation, the laws of the United States are decidedly behind those of almost all other countries in the civilized world. As a rule, our Federal legislation on the subject has proceeded on the assumption that compensation for injury should not be granted in cases where the accident is to any extent due to the negligence of the employee. Most other countries hold, on the contrary, that only a great degree of negligence on an employee's part acts as a bar to his securing damages, because it is recognized as inevitable that daily familiarity with danger will lead men to take chances that may be construed into negligence. It is true that a step was taken in the right direction not long ago when Congress passed the Employers' Liability Act, but this law has been declared by the United States Supreme Court unconstitutional, apparently on account of its including in its provisions employees engaged in intra - state, as well as inter - state, commerce. Creditable, also, to the President's sense of equity is his plea for the increase of the salaries now given to Federal judges. He says with truth that, on the whole, there is no body of public servants in the Republic who do as valuable work, and whose pecuniary reward is so inadequate to their deserts. It is not befitting the dignity of the nation that its most honored public servants should receive stipends so small compared to what they would earn in private life that the performance of their duty involved an exceedingly heavy pecuniary sacrifice.

Timely and helpful, also, is the reference to the urgent necessity of saving the forests of the country from destruction. Mr. Roosevelt says with truth that forests, rivers and the soil constitute three natural resources which any really civilized nation will so use that they will continue to be of benefit in the distant future. Owing to our own reckless abuse of our originally splendid forests, we are already on the verge of a timber famine, and no measures that we may now take can, at least for many years,

repair the mischief that has already been inflicted. In some sections of our country, as, for example, in the Adirondacks, the White Mountains, the Appalachians and the Rocky Mountains, we already see the permanent injury which the soil and the river systems have suffered from wanton deforestation. Further mischief can be prevented, however, and it would be, as Mr. Roosevelt says, in the highest degree reprehensible to let any consideration of temporary convenience or temporary cost interfere with such precautionary and remedial action, especially as regards the national domain. The desolation which has been brought upon Northern China, upon Central Asia, Palestine, North Africa and parts of the Mediterranean countries of Europe will surely be witnessed in our Republic also if we do not forthwith begin to exercise the wise forethought which should characterize any people calling itself civilized. It is criminal to permit individuals to purchase a little gain for themselves through the sweeping devastation of forests, when such devastation will prove fatal to the well-being of the nation hereafter.

Another of Mr. Roosevelt's demands which will be seconded heartily by those who are conversant with the naval programmes of Great Britain, Germany and Japan, is that for four new battleships of the *Dreadnought* type, if not superior thereto. It is undoubtedly desirable to complete as soon as possible a squadron of eight battleships exemplifying the highest plane of efficiency yet attained. The *North Dakota*, the *Delaware*, the *Florida* and the *Utah* will constitute the first division of this squadron, and the four vessels now proposed the second division. It is patent, also, that all of the vessels belonging to the squadron should have the same tactical qualities, as regards, that is, speed and turning circle. No matter how desirable and even important this immediate increase of our navy is felt to be by experts, nobody believes that the present Congress will authorize the beginning of more than two battleships this year.

One of the features of Mr. Roosevelt's last Message, which has given great offence, is the attack on the Federal Judiciary, an attack not the less harmful because it is accompanied with the perfunctory admission that our judicial system is sound at the core. Mr. Roosevelt insists that there are Federal judges who show inability or unwillingness to put a stop to the wrong-doing of very rich men under modern industrial conditions; and inabil-

ity or unwillingness to afford relief to men of small means or wage-workers who are crushed down by these modern industrial conditions: judges, in other words, who fail to understand and apply the needed remedies for the new wrongs produced by the new and highly complex social and industrial civilization which has grown up in the last half-century. Elsewhere the President declares that some members of the judicial body have lagged behind in their understanding of the great and vital changes in the body politic; judges whose minds have never been opened to the new applications of the old principles made necessary by the new conditions. He adds that judges of this stamp do lasting harm by their decisions, because they convince poor men in need of protection that the Courts of the land are profoundly ignorant of and out of sympathy with their needs, and profoundly indifferent or hostile to any proposed remedies. "We must face the fact," says Mr. Roosevelt, "that there are wise and unwise judges." That is a truism. Such has always been the case. The objection to the great space and stress allotted to the subject in Mr. Roosevelt's last Message is that it conveys a false impression as to the comparative amount of unwisdom on the Federal bench. Few persons reading the President's diatribe would guess, what, nevertheless, is true, that at no time in the history of our Federal Judiciary has the standard of qualifications been higher than it is to-day.

It is not surprising that both Chambers of the Federal Legislature should be deeply affronted by the intimation in the President's Message that it is known to many members of Congress that their private lives, or public conduct, or both, will not bear investigation. It will be observed that the President has not confined himself to assailing the integrity of certain individual Congressmen; he has assailed the integrity of the Congress itself. Unless, therefore, the truth of the accusation is challenged, every European sovereign will be justified in pointing to Mr. Roosevelt's uncontradicted words as proofs that American institutions are a degraded form of government. Unless Congress is willing to abdicate its dignity and influence, to renounce even a reputation for decent probity, it must call upon the President to prove that he spake truthfully when he says that the restriction of the use of the Secret Service funds by a recent statute operates only to the advantage of the criminal, and that the restriction was

adopted for no other reason than because Congressmen did not themselves wish to be investigated.

The identical declarations issued simultaneously by Secretary Root and by Baron Takahira, Japanese Ambassador at Washington, concerning the intentions of their respective countries with reference to the Far East are generally deemed to constitute a notable diplomatic achievement from the view-point of tactical form as well as substance. As regards form, it is obvious that what we have is neither a treaty, nor a convention, nor even an agreement, and there is, therefore, nothing requiring the sanction of two-thirds of the Senate. Each country, speaking for itself, through its Foreign Office, defines the policy which it is firmly resolved to pursue, with regard, first, to the independence and territorial integrity of China; secondly, with regard to equal opportunities of trade therewith, or, in other words, the "Open Door"; and, lastly, with regard to the integrity of the respective possessions of Japan and the United States in the Far East. It will be observed that neither of the two countries last named binds itself to guarantee the other's possessions; but each announces the intention of respecting them, and, also, should they be threatened with encroachment by a third country, the intention of considering what action should be taken in the premises and of communicating promptly its conclusion to the other party to the concurrent declarations. It may, at the first glance, be thought that, if there is nothing in the transaction for the Senate to take hold of, there can be nothing in it of much value to either the United States or Japan. The fact, however, that the two declarations are identical and simultaneous is recognized by diplomatists, not only in Washington and Tokio, but also in European capitals, as an incident of great importance, which practically imposes a weighty moral obligation on both parties. If, before he goes out of office, Mr. Root shall also arrive at a similar understanding with Japan in reference to the emigration question, the country will, indeed, have reason to congratulate itself on the results of his tenure of the State Department.